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CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

THE CRIMINAL LEGAL SYSTEM DOESN’T CARE
ABOUT YOUR MENTAL ILLNESS
A Review of THE OTHER DR. GILMER: TWO MEN, A MURDER, AND AN
UNLIKELY FIGHT FOR JUSTICE
By Fredrick E. Vars†

Why would a beloved small-town doctor with no history of violence suddenly
strangle his father to death? The Other Dr. Gilmer is a gripping account of the
search for an answer to this question. It turns out the doctor has a rare neurological
disorder that likely caused the killing. If only the diagnosis had come before trial,
the author believes, the doctor would not have been convicted of first-degree murder
and sentenced to life without parole. That belief is appealing, but naïve. Jails and
prisons are full of people with mental illness. Misdiagnosis is not the reason. A close
examination of the doctor’s case reveals several doctrinal and structural forces that
effectively criminalize mental illness. The doctor’s diagnosis is the key to the medical
mystery, but it would not have been a key to the jailhouse door. For many individuals
with mental illness, avoiding the criminal legal system entirely is the only way to
avoid injustice.

†

Ira Drayton Pruitt, Sr. Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law.

151

152

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 152
I.

THE SCENE, THE KILLING, AND THE MEDICAL MYSTERY .............................. 153

II. VINCE WAS LEGALLY COMPETENT, DIAGNOSIS OR NOT ............................... 155
A. Competence to Stand Trial.................................................................. 156
B. Competence to Represent Oneself ...................................................... 159
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE FOR VINCE? CLOSE, BUT NOT QUITE ...................... 162
A. Even with the Diagnosis, Vince’s Insanity Defense Would Have Failed
............................................................................................................. 163
B. The Problems with the Insanity Defense Go Way Beyond Vince........ 165
CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................... 168

INTRODUCTION
The Other Dr. Gilmer1 is a compelling case study of how the legal
system treats individuals with mental health problems. The author is a
doctor, Benjamin Gilmer, on a quest to understand a brutal murder by the
doctor he replaced in a small-town practice and who, by strange
coincidence, shares the doctor’s last name (Vince Gilmer). Eventually,
Benjamin diagnoses his predecessor Vince with a rare neurological
condition. If only the diagnosis had come sooner, the author believes,
Vince would not be in prison.2
This belief is appealing, but it is also naïve. The criminal legal
system in the United States is designed to put people with mental illness
in jail and prison. In this regard, the system is wildly successful. “An
estimated 56 percent of state prisoners, 45 percent of federal prisoners,
and 64 percent of jail inmates have a mental health problem.”3 Diagnosis
or not, Vince was very likely headed to prison.
The remainder of this review consists of three parts and a
conclusion. Part I describes the backdrop, the killing and cover-up, and
the quest to correctly diagnose Vince. Part II argues that Vince would

1 BENJAMIN GILMER, THE OTHER DR. GILMER: TWO MEN, A MURDER, AND AN UNLIKELY
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE (2022).
2 Id. at 207–08.
3 KIDEUK KIM, MIRIAM BECKER-COHEN, & MARIA SERAKOS, URB. INST., THE PROCESSING
AND TREATMENT OF MENTALLY ILL PERSONS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM v (2015),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/48981/2000173-The-Processing-andTreatment-of-Mentally-Ill-Persons-in-the-Criminal-Justice-System.pdf [https://perma.cc/25T7562Z].
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have been found competent to stand trial and competent to represent
himself, even with the correct diagnosis. Part III explains that while the
insanity defense is a closer question, the right diagnosis probably would
not have made a difference there either. Our legal system has largely
rejected the principle that individuals cannot be held criminally
responsible for actions they could not control.
A psychiatric diagnosis only rarely affects criminal proceedings or
verdicts. Our system shuns compassion and treatment over and over
throughout the process. Reversing the range of precedent that effectively
criminalizes mental illness is not realistic.4 What is needed instead are
workarounds: ways to avoid the almost unmitigated harshness of the
criminal legal system. The conclusion identifies key off-ramps on the
road toward incarceration.
I. THE SCENE, THE KILLING, AND THE MEDICAL MYSTERY
In 2009, Benjamin Gilmer interviewed for his first job as a doctor.5
It was at a small clinic in rural North Carolina.6 The interview was pretty
normal until they asked, “Do you know why this clinic was closed?”7
Benjamin responded: “Broadly, yes. But I don’t really know the details.”8
What Benjamin did know, and what everyone in the area knew, was that
the previous doctor had violently killed his father and was now in prison.9
The interview was about to get even stranger: “Do you know that you and
the previous doctor there have the same last name?”10 Yes, Benjamin
knew that the previous doctor’s name was Vince Gilmer. Benjamin
downplayed the coincidence and got the job.
After starting at the clinic, it quickly became clear to Benjamin that
his predecessor Vince was a beloved doctor and an exceptionally
generous and gentle person. For example, Benjamin learns from a staff
member that Vince relocated mice from the clinic to a field because he
“couldn’t bear to kill little animals like that.”11 Benjamin wonders how

4 See Fredrick E. Vars, When God Spikes Your Drink: Guilty Without Mens Rea, 4 CALIF. L.
REV. CIRCUIT 209 (2013) (showing how the criminal law is often more lenient toward defendants
who were intoxicated at the time of the offense than it is toward defendants with the same
impairment due to mental illness).
5 GILMER, supra note 1, at 8.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 12.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 31.
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someone this gentle could have killed his own father, and the search for
answers begins.12
Many of the key facts are undisputed. On June 28, 2004, Vince
drove to pick up his father Dalton Gilmer at the psychiatric facility where
Dalton had lived for two years.13 Dalton was diagnosed with
schizophrenia.14 Vince had arranged for Dalton to be cared for at a
retirement facility just a five-minute drive from Vince’s house.15 They
never made it. Some history is needed to understand why not. Vince
explained in a letter that during childhood he and his sister had suffered
severe and repeated sexual abuse at the hands of their father.16 On the day
Vince picked up his father, Vince claims that Dalton asked Vince whether
Vince wanted to suck Dalton’s “hard on” like Vince used to do as a
child.17 Vince snapped and strangled his father: “The compulsion took
over. I loved killing my [f****t] dad.”18
In the following hours and days, Vince tried very hard to avoid
detection.19 Vince “cut the fingers off to hide the identity” of his father’s
body.20 Next, Vince washed his pickup truck.21 He bought peroxide at
Walmart to clean his hands.22 After a couple days, Vince filed a missing
person report.23 When he saw police lights at the clinic, he walked seven
miles and hid until dusk under the deck of a house.24 He eventually made
a new plan to “get some camping gear and go hiking.”25 That plan was
interrupted by a police officer who asked Vince for identification. Vince
ran, jumped into a stream, and hid.26

12

Id.
Id. at 3.
14 Id. at 4.
15 Id.
16 Proceedings of Trial Volume II at 182, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 16, 2005).
17 Id. at 183.
18 Id. The letter confession would have been admissible even if Vince had shown that the letter
was also the product of mental illness, not a voluntary exercise of free will. See Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986). But see id. at 173 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (explaining that waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice”).
19 I outline Vince’s efforts at concealment in detail because these efforts turn out to be critical
in evaluating Vince’s insanity defense. See infra text accompanying notes 97–100.
20 Proceedings of Trial Volume II at 184, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 16, 2005).
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 185.
25 Id.
26 Id.
13
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After Vince was arrested, and all the way through trial, Vince
maintained that he was suffering from “SSRI withdrawal” syndrome and
that’s why Vince could not resist the compulsion to kill his father.27 Vince
had recently stopped taking Lexapro and a witness testified at trial that
Vince was “a different person” without it.28 This actually was not a bad
theory. One review article published the next year estimated that
“antidepressant discontinuation syndrome” occurs in twenty percent of
patients who stop abruptly.29 Symptoms for withdrawal from SSRIs in
particular can include “aggression/irritability,” “agitation,” and
“anxiety.”30
Antidepressant withdrawal is just the starting point for the engaging
medical mystery that takes up roughly the first half of the book. Benjamin
takes seriously the possibility that stopping Lexapro may have been partly
to blame.31 A second candidate is the severe concussion that Vince
suffered in a car accident just months before the event.32 But the plot
really thickens the first time Benjamin visits Vince in jail. Vince
“shuffled toward us, moving so slowly I thought his feet were shackled
at first.”33 Struggling to speak, Vince’s “face began to contort, his mouth
opening and closing, his eyes deviating upward and to the left.”34 Fingers
twitched; lips curled.35 Floored by these extreme physical symptoms,
Benjamin brings a psychiatrist friend, Steve Buie, with him on his next
visit to Vince. It is Buie who suggests Huntington’s disease,36 which
genetic testing later confirms. The diagnosis is the key to the medical
mystery, but a diagnosis alone is not the key to the jailhouse door.
II. VINCE WAS LEGALLY COMPETENT, DIAGNOSIS OR NOT
There were two different types of legal competence at issue in
Vince’s trial: his ability to understand the process and his ability to act as
his own lawyer. On the first issue, Benjamin suggests that a Huntington’s
27

GILMER, supra note 1, at 106–07.
Terri Worley testified that Vince told her he had seizures after coming off the Lexapro and
that Vince, after his arrest, was “a different person than I had talked to before, or worked for.”
Proceedings of Trial Volume IV Part II at 30, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 18, 2005).
29 Christopher H. Warner, William Bobo, Carolynn Warner, Sara Reid & James Rachal,
Antidepressant Discontinuation Syndrome, 74 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 449, 449 (2006).
30 Id. at 452 tbl.2.
31 GILMER, supra note 1, at 55–60.
32 Id. at 71.
33 Id. at 93.
34 Id. at 94.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 136.
28

156

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE NOVO

[2022

diagnosis could have led the court to find Vince incompetent to stand
trial.37 The forensic psychologist knows better.38 Self-representation
raises more complicated issues, but the Huntington’s diagnosis would not
have mattered on that issue either.
A.

Competence to Stand Trial

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
criminal proceedings from going forward against defendants who cannot
understand what is going on or who cannot meaningfully assist their
attorneys. Specifically, the defendant must have “sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and [have] a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him.”39 This is a functional test designed to
ensure that all criminal defendants have a genuine opportunity to
participate in the process that may deprive them of life or liberty. The
reason for incompetence usually does not matter. To be sure, having a
mental illness can be relevant (and in some jurisdictions it is necessary),40
but no diagnosis is sufficient on its own to establish incompetence to
stand trial.41 Courts regularly reject incompetence claims from
defendants with known mental health issues that cause severe functional
deficits.42

37 Id. at 208.
38 Id. at 276.
39 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). A Virginia statute codifies this
requirement. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-167 (“No person shall, while he is insane or feebleminded,
be tried for a criminal offense.”). The language of the statute is outdated, but the requirement is
essentially the same as the federal constitutional standard. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-169.1(A)
(“lacks substantial capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist his attorney in
his own defense”).
40 For example, federal statute requires a “mental disease or defect.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 4241(d)
(West). See generally Andrew D. Reisner & Jennifer L. Piel, Mental Condition Requirement in
Competency to Stand Trial Assessments, 46 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 86 (2018),
http://jaapl.org/content/46/1/86 [https://perma.cc/4G46-A23U].
41 Clark v. Commonwealth, 865 S.E.2d 421, 428 (Va. App. 2021) (explaining that “past or
present mental illness alone does not necessarily provide probable cause” to question competence
to stand trial); State v. Gerrier, 197 A.3d 1083, 1089 (Me. 2018) (“[A] defendant may be both
mentally ill and competent to stand trial.”).
42 Gerrier, 197 A.3d at 1089 (affirming a finding of competence notwithstanding a
psychologist’s concern that the defendant’s “combination of intellectual disability, autism spectrum
disorder, and significant mood issues do significantly impair his ability to demonstrate the full
range of trial competence skills needed for this complex situation.”); see also Clark v.
Commonwealth, 865 S.E.2d 421, 428 (Va. App. 2021) (“Mental incompetence requires that a
defendant’s bizarre behavior or mental illness interfere with his present capacity to participate in
and understand proceedings at the time of trial.”).
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An earlier diagnosis would not have affected the court’s finding that
Vince was competent to stand trial. Neither the United States Constitution
nor Virginia law requires a diagnosis for incompetence to stand trial. A
diagnosis was therefore not legally relevant at Vince’s trial in Virginia.
But perhaps the diagnosis could have helped substantiate claims of
functional impairment that were relevant. The fundamental problem with
this theory is that Vince, diagnosis or not, cleared by a wide margin the
very low bar for competence to stand trial. Here are a few excerpts from
the report of the state’s forensic psychologist who examined Vince:
[Vince] was fully aware of the nature and seriousness of his charges.
....
. . . In discussing an example of a plea bargain, [Vince] demonstrated
the ability to rationally balance risk and benefit and showed no
impairment from any symptoms of depression or anxiety.
. . . [Vince] demonstrated the ability to provide his account of the
alleged offense, to consider alternative defense strategies, and to assist
in the development of his defense. . . . Of particular importance, the
defendant’s attention became very focused and his demeanor calm and
reality-based when discussing possible legal strategies.43

Note that none of these opinions turns on the presence or absence of
a mental health diagnosis; like the test itself, these observations are purely
functional. In finding Vince competent to stand trial, the judge relied on
the forensic psychology report and his own direct questioning of Vince.44
Neither Vince nor his standby lawyers at any point during trial ever
suggested that Vince was not competent to stand trial.
With or without a diagnosis, Vince was going to be found competent
to stand trial. Case law has interpreted the Court’s competency standard
to set a very low bar. In one case, a psychiatrist testified that the defendant
could not process complex questions and “did not have more than a
superficial understanding of key legal processes.”45 Such a defendant
cannot understand or meaningfully participate in the proceedings, but the
trial court nonetheless found the defendant to be competent. The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the lower court finding, reasoning
that any understanding of the situation and any ability to assist counsel
renders a defendant competent to stand trial.46 The forensic psychologist

43 Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial at 4–5, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162
(Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. Jan. 20, 2005).
44 Trial Court Order, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. July 29,
2005).
45 Brown v. O’Brien, 666 F.3d 818, 826 (1st Cir. 2012)
46 Id. (“[A]ll experts agreed that he at least possessed some understanding of the situation and
some ability to reason about it and discuss issues with counsel.”).
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who examined Vince is clearly right: even with a timely diagnosis, Vince
would have been deemed competent to stand trial.47
The lesson from Vince’s case is that nearly all defendants are
competent to stand trial, with or without a mental illness. In many
jurisdictions (like Virginia), the fact of mental illness is legally irrelevant.
Even where mental illness is relevant, the bar for competence is so low
that most mentally ill defendants (like Vince) nonetheless clear it.
Incompetence is generally not a way to get out of jail. To the contrary, in
many states, due to “system overload,” the few defendants who are found
incompetent “typically wait in jails,” not treatment facilities, and receive
only the most basic mental health treatment, if they are lucky.48
Defendants may never receive services designed to restore competence
or may receive such services only after delays of months or years.49
The ABA Mental Health Standards and many states require defense
counsel to raise incompetence every time counsel has doubts.50 This
requirement was controversial even before the competency restoration
process collapsed in many states.51 Especially now, defense counsel may
reasonably decide not to raise the issue of incompetency in close cases if
they believe that decision will advance the best interests of the client.52
For example, a marginally competent defendant could spend less time
incarcerated after pleading guilty than waiting in jail for competency
evaluation and restoration.53 Some substantial number of defendants with
mental illness end up in jail or prison, even though they would have been
found incompetent to stand trial had the issue been raised.

47

GILMER, supra note 1, at 276.
Lisa Callahan & Debra A. Pinals, Challenges to Reforming the Competence to Stand Trial
and Competence Restoration System, 71 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 691, 692 (2020). Some defendants
sent for treatment will refuse it. This creates additional delay and could result in forced treatment.
Fredrick E. Vars, The Value of a Guardian Ad Litem in a Sell Proceeding, 43-MAR CHAMPION 16
(2019).
49 Brian D. Shannon, Competency, Ethics, and Morality, 49 TEX. TECH L. REV. 861, 862 (2017)
(quoting complaint alleging that in Texas ‘“individuals with mental illness suffer needless
deterioration of their mental health as they wait in jails, frequently in prolonged isolation, for weeks
and months before they receive’ competency restoration services.”); see also Margaret W. Smith,
Restore, Revert, Repeat: Examining the Decompensation Cycle and the Due Process Limitations
on the Treatment of Incompetent Defendants, 71 VAND. L. REV. 319, 322 (2018) (“As an example,
in one notorious Florida case, the defendant, Bobby Lane McGee, bounced between competency
restoration treatment and jail six times, resulting in a seventeen-year delay in his trial and ultimate
conviction—costing the state $1.3 million.”).
50 Mentally challenged clients—Competence, 1 CRIM. PRAC. MANUAL § 6:21 (2022).
51 Id.
52 Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the Mentally
Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 65, 85 (1988).
53 Id. at 75.
48
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Competence to Represent Oneself

The United States Supreme Court in 1975 held that a criminal
defendant has “a constitutional right to proceed without counsel when he
voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.”54 The choice to represent
oneself must be a voluntary exercise of “informed free will.”55 The
wisdom of the decision and defendant’s legal knowledge are irrelevant.56
A defendant cannot be denied his right to proceed pro se “because his
choice is foolish or rash.”57 “The likelihood that a defendant would
incompetently represent himself is not a valid reason to deny his
unequivocal request for self-representation.”58 As with competence to
stand trial, the test is functional: Having a mental disorder precludes a
“voluntary and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel only if the
disorder is shown to undermine the defendant’s understanding of the
decision.59
Applying this standard, Vince’s waiver of the right to counsel was
valid. At a pre-trial hearing, the judge evaluated Vince’s “education and
competence to represent himself.”60 The judge had before him the
expert’s report on competency to stand trial, which stated that Vince was
“fully aware of the nature and seriousness of his charges,” and
“demonstrated the ability to rationally balance risk and benefit” and “to
consider alternative defense strategies.”61 Consistent with Supreme Court
precedent,62 the judge warned Vince that he would “be required to follow
the rules of evidence and the procedures of the court.”63 The judge
advised Vince to stick with his lawyer and to consent to the lawyer’s

54

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Id. at 835.
56 Id. at 836.
57 Imani v. Pollard, 826 F.3d 939, 945 (7th Cir. 2016).
58 Hooker v. State, 152 So. 3d 799, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
59 See Asberry v. Scribner, 460 F. App’x 674, 676 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A]lthough the record
contains evidence of [defendant’s] symptoms, diagnoses and medications-all of which attest to
[defendant’s] [psychotic] disorder—the record is devoid of any explanation as to how those factors
affected (or did not affect) Asberry’s ability to evaluate his counsel and make a voluntary waiver
of his right to counsel.”).
60 Trial Court Order, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. July 29,
2005).
61 Evaluation of Competency to Stand Trial at 4–5, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162
(Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. Jan. 20, 2005).
62 See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (stating that the defendant “should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish
that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open’”).
63 GILMER, supra note 1, at 104.
55
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motion to delay the trial in order to obtain experts.64 Vince refused.65
Benjamin is right that Vince insisting on self-representation was a bad
decision, but it is a decision that mentally ill defendants are allowed to
make all the time.66
The context here may be more important than the low competency
bar in funneling mentally ill individuals into jail and prison. Vince
decided to move forward without an attorney and without delaying trial
to find his own expert witness because he had been suffering in solitary
confinement for a year and three months.67 As if that torture were not bad
enough,68 Vince had been receiving inadequate mental health treatment.69
Going to trial pro se like Vince did is very unusual.70 Many more mentally
ill defendants who have languished in harsh jail conditions decide to take
a more direct escape route: keeping their lawyer and quickly pleading
guilty in hopes of better treatment in prison,71 or at least a defined term
of imprisonment. Horrid conditions and inadequate mental health care in
jails thus leads to more mentally ill individuals in prisons.
The right to self-representation narrowed a few years after Vince’s
trial. The Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards added a new exception:
states may now force a lawyer on defendants who are competent to stand
trial with the assistance of counsel but who, because of severe mental
illness, are not competent to conduct trial proceedings themselves.72
Some states have since held that the standard for competency to selfrepresentation is the same as the standard for competency to stand trial

64

Id.
Id.
66 See, e.g., State v. Gillespie, 898 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (stating that the
validity of waiver does “not rest upon a retrospective view that the defendant here exercised
incredibly poor judgment in the exercise of his power to waive counsel”).
67 GILMER, supra note 1, at 103.
68 Shelby Calambokidis, Beyond Cruel and Unusual: Solitary Confinement and Dignitary
Interests, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1117, 1125 n.50 (2017).
69 Vince reported that “prison officials frequently withheld his medicine, an SSRI, which he
knew helped him.” GILMER, supra note 1, at 97.
70 Very few felony defendants choose to represent themselves—roughly 0.3% to 0.5% in one
study of state and federal cases. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self Representation:
An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 447 (2007). The same
study found that only 10% of state pro se defendants went to trial. Id. at 449.
71 Mental health treatment is generally more available in prison than in jail. One study found
that prisoners who had been told they had a mental disorder (63%) were more likely than jail
inmates (44%) to have received treatment since admission. JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS
BERZOFSKY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INDICATORS OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY
PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011-2012 8 (2017). But treatment in either setting in many states is
“horrendously inadequate.” Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1267 (M.D. Ala. 2017)
(Alabama state prison system); Graves v. Arpaio, No. CV-77-0479-PHX-NVW, 2008 WL
4699770, at *24 (D. Ariz. Oct. 22, 2008) (Maricopa County, Arizona jail).
72 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
65
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outlined above.73 Had Vince been tried in one of these states, the Edwards
holding would have had no impact because Vince was clearly competent
to stand trial. Edwards does nothing in these states to interrupt the flow
of mentally ill individuals into prison.74 Similarly, the timing of Vince’s
diagnosis would not have mattered in at least two other states, because
those states apply Edwards to defendants with or without a “mental
illness.”75 Virginia has not weighed in on either of these issues.
Even if Edwards had been decided and Vince had been diagnosed
before his trial, the court almost certainly would not have overridden his
decision to represent himself. After direct questioning, the court
specifically found that Vince was competent not just to stand trial, but
also to represent himself.76 At the sentencing hearing, Vince requested
that his standby lawyer be allowed to take over.77 The court rejected that
request, explaining that it had seen nothing to suggest that Vince was not
competent to represent himself.78 Right or wrong, that ruling came after
the court had observed Vince act as his own lawyer for more than five
days of trial. Edwards gives trial courts the option, but never the duty, to
compel representation by counsel.79 The judge still believed that Vince
was competent to represent himself with nearly complete information
about Vince’s actual performance.80 There is no chance the judge would
have denied Vince his right to act as his own attorney, even if Edwards
and a Huntington’s diagnosis had given the judge that option.
Vince was right that he was “not good” at being a lawyer.81 In the
book, Benjamin describes a litany of missteps.82 But Vince did several
73 Christina L. Patton, E. Lea Johnston, Colleen M. Lillard & Michael J. Vitacco, Legal and
Clinical Issues Regarding the Pro Se Defendant: Guidance for Practitioners and Policy Makers,
25 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 196, 200 (2019).
74 Christopher Slobogin has argued that Edwards, coupled with existing law setting a lower
competency bar to plead guilty, “ensure[s] that the state can proceed as efficiently as possible in
dealing with mentally ill people.” Christopher Slobogin, Mental Illness and Self-Representation:
Faretta, Godinez and Edwards, 7 OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 391, 392 (2009). Judges can force
counsel on potentially disruptive defendants.
75 See E. Lea Johnston, Communication and Competence for Self-Representation, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 2121, 2139 (2016) (Alaska & Wisconsin).
76 Trial Court Order, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. July 29,
2005).
77 Proceedings of Trial Sentencing at 27, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 22, 2005).
78 Id. at 29.
79 Rivers v. Martel, 833 F. App’x 706, 707 (9th Cir. 2021).
80 See United States v. Noel, 768 F. App’x 648, 650 (9th Cir. 2019) (“And hindsight shows us
that Noel actively participated in his defense at trial: he proposed voir dire questions, filed pretrial
motions, gave an opening statement, cross-examined witnesses, and delivered a closing argument.
This type of active participation is significant evidence of competence.”).
81 Proceedings of Trial Volume V at 184, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 19, 2005).
82 GILMER, supra note 1, at 103–23.
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things, including the most important thing, surprisingly well. When
cross-examining a witness, Vince established that he did not benefit
financially from his father’s death.83 Without assistance from standby
counsel, Vince objected to testimony on the ground that the witness did
not “have personal knowledge of this”; the court sustained Vince’s
objection.84 These are two relatively small successes. The jury
instructions reflect his biggest achievement. At the end of the guilt phase,
Vince had introduced enough admissible evidence to merit jury
instructions on insanity and lack of premeditation, which were his only
plausible defenses to first-degree murder. To be sure, the evidence could
have been stronger if Vince had been represented by a qualified attorney,
but that is not the test.85 Being “competent” to represent oneself does not
require the defendant to be a “competent lawyer.”86
III. THE INSANITY DEFENSE FOR VINCE? CLOSE, BUT NOT QUITE
A layperson might believe that the insanity defense prevents the
incarceration of mentally ill defendants who do not deserve punishment.87
The insanity defense does serve this function, but only in a tiny, and
shrinking, fraction of the cases where it should apply.88 “Studies indicate
that nationally, fewer than one percent of criminal cases involve an
insanity defense, and of those cases, the defense succeeds in fewer than a
quarter of them.”89 The insanity defense does not significantly affect the
number of mentally ill individuals in prison.

83 Proceedings of Trial Volume II at 22, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 16, 2005).
84 Id. at 94.
85 See Jason R. Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in A Criminal
Trial: Opportunity and Danger for State Courts After Indiana v. Edwards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 825,
846 (2010) (“The inquiry should focus not on actual courtroom performance but on the defendant’s
ability to understand and communicate.”).
86 State v. Lesnic, 946 N.W.2d 763, 2020 WL 1049826, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020) (rejecting
the argument that “because [the defendant] did not do a very good job of representing herself, she
must not have been competent to represent herself”).
87 The late great Judge Bazelon proposed a formulation of the insanity defense that would have
asked jurors directly whether an impaired defendant could be “justly held responsible for his act.”
United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Unfortunately, this is currently not the law anywhere in the United States.
88 See Eugene M. Fahey, Laura Groschadl, & Brianna Weaver, “The Angels That Surrounded
My Cradle”: The History, Evolution, and Application of the Insanity Defense, 68 BUFF. L. REV.
805, 806 (2020); see also id. at 823–24 (describing how state and federal governments scaled down
the insanity defense in the early 1980s after the Hinckley presidential assassination attempt).
89 Id. at 806.
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Even with the Diagnosis, Vince’s Insanity Defense Would Have
Failed

Remarkably, Vince had a shot at beating these odds. Even without a
lawyer, without a diagnosis, and without his own expert, Vince managed
to introduce enough evidence to justify this instruction:
The Defendant was insane if because of mental defect, disease or
defect he did not understand the nature and character and
consequences of his act, was unable to distinguish right from wrong [,
or] his mind was so impaired by disease that he was unable to resist
the impulse to commit the crime.90

Vince’s evidence of “mental defect or disease” consisted of lay
witness observations regarding Vince’s condition on and off his SSRI.91
Vince tried unsuccessfully to elicit expert testimony recognizing the
existence of SSRI withdrawal syndrome.92 This is where an earlier
diagnosis of Huntington’s would have been most helpful.
Even with the diagnosis, however, the insanity defense would have
had problems. Vince believed he had enough evidence to show that he
suffered from SSRI withdrawal and that that qualified as a “mental defect
or disease.” A definitive Huntington’s diagnosis could have bolstered his
confidence and reinforced his decision to represent himself (which he
would still have had the right to do, as explained above). Either way, a
diagnosis alone is never enough to support an insanity defense.93 In
Virginia, as reflected in the jury instruction above, a defendant must also
prove either (1) “cognitive incapacity” (an inability to know what one
was doing), (2) “moral incapacity” (an inability to know that the act was
wrongful), or (3) an “irresistible impulse” (an inability to resist doing the
act). Vince offered no evidence suggesting either cognitive or moral
incapacity. His theory was textbook “irresistible impulse”: “The
compulsion took over.”94
A Huntington’s diagnosis could have helped corroborate that
testimony. In a more recent Tennessee case, an expert testified that “the
symptoms that go along with personality change due to Huntington’s
90 Proceedings of Trial Volume V at 163–64, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va.
Cir., Wash. Cty. Aug. 19, 2005).
91 Terri Worley testified that Vince told her he had seizures after coming off the Lexapro and
that Vince after his arrest and off his meds was “a different person than I had talked to before, or
worked for.” Proceedings of Trial Volume IV Part I at 30, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05162 (Va. Cir., Wash. Cty. Aug. 18, 2005).
92 GILMER, supra note 1, at 106–08.
93 Criminal Responsibility, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 28, 32 (1996)
(“[G]iving a defendant a [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, or “DSM”]
diagnosis does not in itself establish that he was insane during the commission of a crime.”).
94 GILMER, supra note 1, at 109.
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disease [are] impulsivity, rage, and aggression that far exceeds any
known stresser.”95 So far so good, but Virginia courts interpret irresistible
impulse narrowly: the defendant must be “totally deprived of the mental
power to control or restrain his act.”96 Any amount of planning or
concealment negates an irresistible impulse defense.97 Whether Vince
planned the killing was disputed, but the jury in convicting Vince of firstdegree murder necessarily found that the killing was “willful, deliberate
and premeditated.”98 Whether or not the killing was planned, Vince’s
efforts to conceal it were extensive and undisputed.99 Virginia case law
suggests that the prosecution in Vince’s case might have been able to get
the insanity defense dismissed.100 If so, the issue would not even have
gone to the jury.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity for someone with
Huntington’s would have been unlikely, but not unprecedented.
Benjamin cites the case of Glenda Sue Caldwell,101 a Georgia woman
with suspected Huntington’s who was found “guilty but mentally ill”
(GBMI) of murdering her son.102 The GBMI verdict led to confinement
in prison; a successful insanity defense would have led to commitment in
a state mental health facility.103 Nine years after the conviction, DNA
95 State v. Odle, No. M2014-00349-CCA-R3CD, 2014 WL 6607013, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Nov. 21, 2014) (alteration in original).
96 Bennett v. Commonwealth, 511 S.E.2d 439, 447 (Va. App. 1999); Reid v. True, 349 F.3d
788, 802–03 (4th Cir. 2003). Jessie A. Seiden, The Criminal Brain: Frontal Lobe Dysfunction
Evidence in Capital Proceedings, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 395, 416 (2004) (“Recent Virginia court
decisions have markedly narrowed the irresistible impulse defense.”).
97 Vann v. Commonwealth, 544 S.E.2d 879, 883 (Va. Ct. App. 2001); Snider v. Smyth, 187 F.
Supp. 299, 302 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff’d sub nom., Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683 (4th Cir.
1961). Planning may indeed be inconsistent with an irresistible impulse, but attempting afterward
to avoid detection need not be. A defendant should at least be allowed to argue to the jury that they
acted impulsively in the moment and only took steps to avoid detection after the irresistible impulse
had passed (or that avoiding detection was itself impulsive).
Efforts at concealment can also defeat an insanity defense premised on moral incapacity. Only
someone with a guilty mind runs away, the logic goes. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 746
(2006) (explaining that the trial judge expressly relied on the defendant running away after in
concluding that the defendant, during an undisputed psychotic episode, knew at the moment he
fired the gun that doing so was wrongful).
98 Proceedings of Trial Volume V at 159, Commonwealth v. Gilmer, No. CR 05-162 (Va. Cir.,
Wash. Cty. Aug. 19, 2005). A moment’s reflection is enough for premeditation. Giarratano v.
Commonwealth, 266 S.E.2d 94, 100 (Va. 1980); Whitley v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 162, 165
(Va. 1982). Vince strangled his father to death. GILMER, supra note 1, at 6. The mere fact that
strangulation takes time is enough to infer premeditation. See Cortinas v. State, 195 P.3d 315, 326
(Nev. 2008) (“[T]he use of a ligature and the time required to strangle a person are legitimate
circumstances from which to infer that a killing is willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”).
99 See discussion supra Part I.
100 Vann, 544 S.E.2d at 883.
101 GILMER, supra note 1, at 207–08.
102 Caldwell v. State, 354 S.E.2d 124, 125 (Ga. 1987).
103 GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(3) (West).
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testing conclusively confirmed her Huntington’s diagnosis.104 At a retrial,
the judge found Caldwell not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI).105
Benjamin thinks the Huntington’s diagnosis made the difference,
but it should not have under Georgia law. The jury in the first trial, before
the definitive diagnosis, had already concluded that Caldwell suffered
from a mental illness by rendering a GBMI verdict.106 The Supreme Court
of Georgia upheld the verdict on appeal because the evidence supported
the conclusion that Caldwell failed to meet the other requirements for the
insanity defense: either an inability “to distinguish between right and
wrong,”107 or “a delusional compulsion which overmastered [her] will to
resist.”108 Caldwell’s defense appears to have been that her fear of
contracting Huntington’s—and perhaps her fear that her children would
get it too—generated “a delusional compulsion” to murder her son.109
As with Vince, the symptoms of Huntington’s described above
could have helped substantiate Caldwell’s theory, but the theory was a
legal non-starter for another reason: “if the delusion is as to a fact which
would not excuse the act with which the prisoner is charged, the delusion
does not authorize an acquittal of the defendant.”110 Of course, believing
that you or your children have Huntington’s disease is not an excuse for
murder. The Caldwell retrial did not result in a published opinion and
Benjamin does not explain the reasoning. Given that the retrial lasted only
thirty minutes,111 however, the diagnosis likely was the only new
evidence. If that is true, the NGRI verdict in the Caldwell retrial looks
like an act of mercy, not a faithful application of Georgia law. The judge
simply decided that nine years in prison was enough for someone so sick.
B.

The Problems with the Insanity Defense Go Way Beyond Vince

Virginia’s interpretation of “irresistible impulse” is exceedingly
narrow—so too “delusional compulsion” in Georgia—but the insanity
defense in most states is even narrower. Seventeen states and the federal
government define insanity to include either moral incapacity or
cognitive incapacity.112 In another ten states, the insanity defense requires
104

GILMER, supra note 1, at 207–08.
Id. at 208.
106 Caldwell, 354 S.E.2d at 126 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(b)(2)).
107 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-2).
108 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-3-3.
109 Caldwell, 354 S.E.2d at 125.
110 Mars v. State, 135 S.E. 410, 419 (Ga. 1926).
111 Joan Kirchner, Woman Wins Acquittal in Murder Case by Claiming Huntington’s Disease,
A.P. NEWS (Sept. 28, 1994), https://apnews.com/article/b84f5bac9401c9ab0a91c6c8f1359afc
[https://perma.cc/RMU9-UUK2].
112 Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1046, 1054 app’x. (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105
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moral incapacity.113 In other words, an inability to control one’s actions,
if caused by mental illness, is not an excuse for committing a crime in a
majority of jurisdictions.114 Free will is an essential requirement for
culpability—no one should be held criminally responsible for actions
they could not control. But most states, and the Supreme Court, have
expressly rejected this proposition for the mentally ill.115 These
jurisdictions have chosen to incarcerate mentally ill defendants based on
conduct they were unable to control.
Punishing blameless mentally ill individuals is not only profoundly
unfair, it is inconsistent with older Supreme Court case law delineating
the boundary between civil commitment and criminal punishment.
Preventive detention is justified only where the threat of criminal
punishment would be an inadequate deterrent because the individual has
“serious difficulty in controlling behavior.”116 This defect of control,
coupled with mental illness, separates the individual who may be civilly
confined from “the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an
ordinary criminal case.”117 Only people with free will can choose whether
to conform their conduct to the law and can be justly punished for their
bad choices. Deterrence simply does not work for people who cannot
control their actions. The Supreme Court recognized that criminal
culpability requires free will, but the Court has since forgotten it.
In 2020, the Court in Kahler v. Kansas held that the Due Process
Clause does not require any insanity defense.118 At first blush, Kahler
might seem to allow states to withdraw a special benefit (the insanity
defense) that the states had graciously been providing to mentally ill
defendants. In fact, the effect of the Kahler opinion is to authorize states
to single out mentally ill defendants for unfair punishment, and to
criminalize mental illness.119
The well-established “void-for-vagueness” doctrine rests on the
same ground as the “moral incapacity” prong of the insanity defense. The
principle behind both doctrines is that an individual who could not know
113

Id. at 1054 app’x.
See id. at 1046 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (summarizing the states’ different insanity defense
definitions).
115 Id.
116 Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002).
117 Id.; see also id. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Ordinary recidivists choose to reoffend and
are therefore amenable to deterrence through the criminal law; those subject to civil commitment
under the [relevant state statute], because their mental illness is an affliction and not a choice, are
unlikely to be deterred.”).
118 No state has abolished the insanity defense in the two years after the Supreme Court opinion
permitting it, probably because it is already so narrow that essentially no one qualifies.
119 For other arguments against the majority opinion in Kahler, see Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037–
59 (Breyer, J., dissenting), and Fredrick E. Vars, Of Death and Delusion: What Survives Kahler v.
Kansas?, 169 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 90 (2020).
114
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at the time that they were committing a crime cannot justly be
punished.120 The source of this inability is the only significant difference
between void-for-vagueness and moral incapacity. If the inability is
caused by a poorly worded statute, then criminal sanction is barred by the
Due Process Clause under the void-for-vagueness doctrine. This is
because notice, like control, is an essential prerequisite for punishment.121
If the inability to appreciate wrongfulness is caused by mental illness,
then the Due Process Clause should prohibit criminal sanction for the
same reason. But it does not, according to Kahler.122
An analogy illustrates the point. Suppose I walk across your land
without permission in a jurisdiction that requires “No Trespassing”
signs.123 If I did so because the lettering on your “No Trespassing” sign
had faded and was so blurry as to be indecipherable to an average person,
then a criminal trespass conviction would violate the Due Process Clause.
That is essentially the void-for-vagueness doctrine. On the other hand, if
the lettering on the sign was crystal clear and would have been fine for a
person with ordinary vision, but I could not read the sign because I am
colorblind, well, that is no defense under the law. Of course, it is not my
fault that I am colorblind, any more than it is my fault I have a serious
mental illness.124 The Constitution provides greater protection to
“ordinary” people than to people with mental illness.125
In its opinion gutting the insanity defense, the Supreme Court relied
on the fact that mental illness evidence was still allowed in sentencing.126
That may sound good in theory, but it is little consolation in practice.
Vince’s sentence likely would not have changed with a definitive
Huntington’s diagnosis. In a study that seems almost designed for
Vince’s case, each respondent was asked to sentence a hypothetical
individual convicted of second-degree murder.127 The only fact that
differed across scenarios was the argument for leniency. In one version,

120 Cf. Timothy A. Wilkins, Regulatory Confusion, Ignorance of Law, and Deference to
Agencies: General Electric Co. v. EPA, 49 SMU L. REV. 1561, 1573–74 (1996) (observing that
fair notice is the root principle for both the insanity defense and the void-for-vagueness doctrine).
121 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
122 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1021.
123 IAN AYRES & FREDRICK E. VARS, WEAPON OF CHOICE: FIGHTING GUN VIOLENCE WHILE
RESPECTING GUN RIGHTS 84 (2020) (explaining that about half of states allow trespassing with
firearms on private land unless the owner posts signs at designated intervals).
124 In fact, I do suffer from both colorblindness and mental illness, unapologetically.
125 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (explaining that a criminal law is void for vagueness if it does not
“give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited”
(emphasis added)).
126 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026 (“Kansas sentencing law thus provides for an individualized
determination of how mental illness, in any or all of its aspects, affects culpability.”).
127 Paul S. Appelbaum & Nicholas Scurich, Impact of Behavioral Genetic Evidence on the
Adjudication of Criminal Behavior, 42 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 91, 94 (2014).
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the defendant’s counsel argued that his client’s impulsivity was caused
by child abuse (just as Vince did).128 Another version attributed the
impulsivity to the combination of child abuse and a genetic condition,
which is exactly what Vince could have done with an earlier Huntington’s
diagnosis.129 The sentences imposed by respondents in these two
scenarios were essentially the same.130 Perhaps more troubling, sentences
were significantly shorter for defendants who offered no explanation or
excuse for their impulsive crime.131 Adding facts and conditions to
explain a crime apparently leads most jurors to conclude that repetition
of the crime is more likely and to impose harsher sentences. The
sympathy argument backfires, and fear prevails.
CONCLUSION
The criminal legal system is not designed to provide justice for
mentally ill defendants. Questioning competence to stand trial can result
in months or even years in jail, where conditions are often terrible and
treatment inadequate, before efforts to restore competency even begin.
This puts pressure on defendants to fake competence and accept plea
deals. Vince did not fall into that trap, but poor jail conditions in his case—including months of suffering in solitary confinement—led directly to
his bad decision to fire his lawyers and represent himself. But even with
lawyers, experts, and a diagnosis, Vince’s insanity defense likely would
have been doomed by his efforts at concealment. Virginia is far from
alone in narrowing its insanity defense to exclude many individuals who
do not deserve punishment. And the U.S. Supreme Court has recently
given every state permission to eliminate the insanity defense entirely.
Culpability is not required to send a mentally ill person to prison (or death
row).
The most promising way forward may not be tinkering with such a
fundamentally broken machine, but instead figuring out ways to avoid it.
This should start with the first point of contact between individuals and
the state: educating the public to call the new national mental health crisis
number, 9-8-8, rather than 9-1-1, and, in most cases, responding with
mental health professionals rather than armed police officers.132 Some
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Id. at 95 tbl.2.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 I feel lucky to have survived a police interaction during my first manic episode. Fredrick E.
Vars, The Most Dangerous Moment of My Life: Reducing Police Killings During Mental Health
Crises, HARV. L. REV. BLOG (July 6, 2022), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/most-dangerousmoment-of-my-life [https://perma.cc/NQ7Q-KR34].
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mentally ill individuals will still end up in jail. Many of those can and
should be promptly diverted into specialty courts, where the focus is on
treatment rather than punishment.133 Above all, to reduce the number of
mental health crises in the first place, we need robust mental health
treatment in the community, long promised and long denied.134
Postscript. Vince’s story has more surprises. In January 2022 (too
late to make it into the book), the Governor of Virginia granted Vince a
pardon, citing the Huntington’s diagnosis.135 Finally, the system provided
Vince with a measure of mercy, but only after he had spent more than
fifteen years in prison.136 The improbability of this outcome is quite
frankly staggering. No one should expect it to be repeated. First, there
was the bizarre coincidence of the new doctor sharing the same unusual
last name as the old one.137 Second, Huntington’s disease is incredibly
rare.138 Third, Benjamin and his expert helpers heroically dedicated years
of their lives to this quest for justice. Fourth, they did not give up even
after two governors in a row rejected their clemency petitions.139 Fifth,
Benjamin wrote and published an entire book and delivered it to the
133 Edward P. Mulvey & Carol A. Schubert, Mentally Ill Individuals in Jails and Prisons, 46
CRIME & JUST. 231, 253–55 (2017). The Sequential Intercept Model is a helpful framework that
includes specialty courts, as well as other interventions. Id. at 247 fig.1. Washington County,
Virginia, where Vince was tried, still has no specialty mental health court. Virginia
Behavioral/Mental Health Dockets (June 13, 2022), https://www.vacourts.gov/courtadmin/aoc/djs/
programs/sds/programs/bhd/advisory/bhd_directory.pdf [https://perma.cc/V7ZV-YR5R].
134 Fredrick E. Vars & Shelby B. Calambokidis, From Hospitals to Prisons: A New Explanation,
102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 101, 108–10 (2017). There is some cause for hope: Congress just
this year allocated significant federal resources to crisis intervention programs including mental
health courts ($750 million), and to mental health services more broadly ($1 billion). Chip
Brownlee & Tom Kutsch, What You Need to Know About the Senate Gun Reform Bill, THE TRACE
(June 24, 2022), https://www.thetrace.org/2022/06/senate-gun-bill-safer-communities-act
[https://perma.cc/EX6A-QMAZ].
135 Office of the Governor, List of Pardons, Commutations, Reprieves and Other Forms of
Clemency 318–19, https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2022/SD2/PDF [https://perma.cc/R43Y5HKG].
136 Id.
137 There were just 6,697 people named “Gilmer” in the 2010 Census; there were well over
5,000 more common surnames. U.S. Census Bureau, Frequently Occurring Surnames from the
2010 Census, https://www.census.gov/topics/population/genealogy/data/2010_surnames.html
[https://perma.cc/T7NR-D2XH]. The overall population was 308,745,538. U.S. Census Bureau
Announces 2010 Census Population Counts Apportionment Counts Delivered to President, (Dec.
21,
2010),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb10cn93.html#:~:text=The%20U.S.%20Census%20Bureau%20announced,U.S.%20resident%20pop
ulation%20of%20281%2C421%2C906 [https://perma.cc/TU8S-9YL4].
138 Cleveland
Clinic,
Huntington’s
Disease
(last
visited
July
27,
2022)
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/14369-huntingtons-disease [https://perma.cc/Z5ATFVVC] (“In North America, the prevalence of HD was 5.7 per 100,000 people.”).
139 Eileen Finan, After a Beloved Small-Town Doctor Murdered His Own Father, the Clinic’s
New Doc Solved the Mystery of Why, PEOPLE (Mar. 03, 2022, 10:00 AM), https://people.com/
crime/after-a-beloved-small-town-doctor-murdered-his-own-father-the-clinics-new-doc-solvedthe-mystery-of-why [https://perma.cc/FEF5-U5BK].
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second governor in a Hail Mary bid for reconsideration. Sixth, that
governor happened to be a neurologist, which made him almost uniquely
qualified to understand Huntington’s disease. Last, the book made it to
the governor (or to someone on his staff) just as the governor was leaving
office and therefore had nothing to lose politically from appearing “soft
on crime.” Vince’s story has many powerful lessons, but it does not chart
a path out of prison that anyone else can expect to follow.
Perhaps the cruelest twist in Vince’s story is that he remains in
prison nearly seven months after he was pardoned.140 The language of the
pardon requires that Vince be admitted to an adequate treatment
facility.141 One might think that the state would simply transfer Vince to
the perfectly appropriate public mental health hospital that is adjacent to
his prison.142 But the state claims to have a policy prohibiting direct
transfers, so Vince must instead raise approximately $100,000 for
temporary placement at a private facility in order to be eligible for the
state hospital when he runs out of money.143 The criminal legal system’s
indifference to individuals’ mental health and wellbeing is astounding.

140 Gregory S. Schneider, Pardoned but Still in Prison: Advocates Work to Free Man Caught in
System, WASH. POST. (Aug. 6, 2022 8:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/
08/06/northam-gilmer-doctors-murder-pardon [https://perma.cc/Z6LL-3J6G].
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.

